A Skirmish in the Old Northwest:
The Battle of Fallen Timbers as an Insignificant Event
in the History of American Expansion
The American military victory at what came to be known as the Battle of Fallen Timbers is often considered the moment at which the Old Northwest was "won." This oversimplification not only detracts from the well structured effect of Wayne's entire 1794 campaign, it also fails to attribute importance to the conflict at Fort Recovery, the diplomatic efforts of John Jay, and the successful Treaty of Greeneville in August of 1795. Not merely one battle, (which in terms of duration, casualties, and finality was more similar to a skirmish) but a long series of events culminating in the Treaty of Greeneville was responsible for the "winning" of the Old Northwest. The Battle of Fallen Timbers, when considered independently from the events of great consequence occurring before and after, was not a decisive event in the history of American expansion.
Because of the drastic consequences of St. Clair's defeat in 1791, historians that recount Wayne's campaign are eager to draw contrasts between the leadership of St. Clair and that of Wayne. Those historians inclined to write pro-American accounts of these campaigns emphasize the point that St. Clair's army was woefully trained and supplied, and that Wayne's army achieved victory by avoiding the fateful lessons of St. Clair. These accounts miss the point that St. Clair's defeat had as much or more to do with the brilliant military leadership of Little Turtle and Blue Jacket than any difficulties with quartermaster's office. Wayne, like St. Clair, experienced difficulties with his provision supplies but this is not heavily stressed by many historians likely because he was ultimately victorious. Wayne's biographers often discuss the Battle of Fallen Timbers in grand terms and heavily emphasize Wayne's generalship and tact in securing victory, while failing to mention the extreme difficulties the Indian Confederacy faced in establishing their resistance.
Biased Presentation of Events
The pro-American attitude is most greatly exaggerated in speeches that celebrated the anniversaries of major Indian battles or the unveiling of monuments. Although these speeches are not always given by historians, their biased presentation of historical events cannot be totally divorced from the flawed histories that they have been exposed to. For example, while speaking to a crowd assembled in Toledo to witness the 1929 unveiling of an Anthony Wayne monument, Secretary of War James W. Good informed his audience that:
If we visualize a map of the United States as it would have been without the victory at Fallen Timbers, we see the great states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan and Minnesota forming the south central portion of Canada, a Canada reaching deep down into the very heart of our Mid-West. Such a gigantic wedge driven into the very vitals of our young nation would have discouraged all westward expansion and our future history might well have been the story of a few stunted colonies penned in between the Appalachians and the sea. It was only by the retention of the Northwest Territory that the Louisiana Purchase was made possible, followed inevitably by the addition of Texas and California to the national domain and the westward march of the most triumphant migration in all the history of mankind.
Here not only was the Northwest Territory being attributed to Wayne's victory, but so too the entire progeny of Manifest Destiny. A more balanced presentation of historical fact would focus less on the so called battle itself, and more on the failed attack on Fort Recovery by the Indians on 31 June 1794, Jay's Treaty which was signed on 19 November 1794, and the Treaty of Greeneville which was signed 3 August 1795. These three events provide indispensable context for what actually made westward expansion into the Northwest Territory possible. Unfortunately these events are often deemphasized in historians' accounts and the Battle of Fallen Timbers has thus been portrayed as a more glorious and important event than it actually was.
Historian Randolph C. Downes argues that the victory at Fallen Timbers was an inevitable result of the Indians' failure to storm Fort Recovery on July 1, 1794, nearly two months before the battle largely considered the one that "won" the Northwest Territory took place. Downes states that "the attack on Fort Recovery was the beginning of the end...the confederacy had failed. The issue of Fallen
Timbers and the treaty of Greenville had been decided."
The Indians had "attained their maximum force by the middle of June" but knew
that such a force would grow restless and its numbers diminish without a prompt
The Indians, because they were still waiting for official British troop
support, drafted "all white traders among them, and with this motley array of
leaders, the Indians, two thousand strong, advanced in two divisions against
the Americans at Fort Recovery, which had been built on the same spot where the
Indians had so thoroughly defeated St. Clair three years earlier.
This time around the Indians surprised a party of American soldiers who were
outside the fort's walls, but did not prevent the Americans from retreating
back into the fort. Once the Americans had returned to safety within the walls,
the Indians made several, costly dashes into open ground in an attempt to storm
the fortifications. After about 200 Indians had been killed, with minimal
losses suffered by the Americans, the Confederacy retired dejectedly from the
surrounding forest. British Colonel R.C. England reported that this attack had
"all the ill consequences of a defeat, without materially weakening the
A British Indian agent who had participated in the battle wrote after the lost
battle: "Instead of having about 2000 men as was expected we will not have now
above 500- such a disappointment never was met withÉI must observe with grief
that the Indians had never it in their power to do more- and have done so
Protecting the Frontier
The Battle of Fallen Timbers, which occurred nearly two months after the failed
siege of Fort Recovery, had been in the works since the staggering defeat of
General St. Clair's army on November 4, 1791. St. Clair's defeat prompted a new
course of action for the United States government in trying to maintain control
over the Northwest Territory. On March 15, 1792 Congress passed legislation
entitled "An Act for making further and more effectual provision for the
protection of the Frontiers of the United States."
The act greatly increased the size of America's standing army, which had lost
about two-thirds of its members during St. Clair's defeat, and ordered the
professionalization of the newly recruited troops that would make up the
American Legion. Anthony Wayne accepted his appointment to Major General of the
Legion on April 13, 1792 and moved towards Pittsburgh to assemble and train his
forces. A campaign against the hostile Indian Confederacy was only to begin if
the peace negotiations taking place with the Indians in the summer of 1793
should fail. The Indians
refused to accept any treaty proposal in which the Ohio River was not the
boundary between them and the United States and the negotiations broke off by
September 3, 1794. The American commissioners were not only disappointed with
the Indians, but also with the British who had served as translators during the
proceedings and whom the Americans alleged had unduly interfered in the
After the negotiations ended, Wayne was given permission to march northward from Fort
Washington but Wayne decided that it was too late in the summer to begin a
campaign. He was left by Secretary of War Henry Knox to judge, "Whether your
force will be adequate to make those audacious savages feel our superiority in
Arms. Every offer has been made to obtain peace by milder terms than the sword-
the efforts have failed under circumstances which leave nothing for us to
expect but war." Knox's
bitter tone underscores the resentment the American peace commissioners felt at
their failure during the Sandusky negotiations of 1793. Neither the U.S.
government nor the American people were anxious to start another costly Indian
campaign if it could be avoided. Historian Thomas Boyd states, "At that time
the United States were profoundly opposed to war...the country had bitterly
protested against the enormous expense and failures of the earlier campaigns;
and if this last one was to be like the others it was probable that the public
would refuse to support another."
A War Easily Won
Not only were the citizens hostile to an Indian war, they were also resistant to an encounter
with the British, believing that in such an encounter "the great interest of
the nation" would be sacrificed because of the "clamor and private interest of
a few men."
As late as 24 May, 1794, when Wayne's army was in its final stages of preparing
to march northward, speeches were given in the Kentucky legislature "in the
most inflammatory & invective language" with one speaker concluding, "I
shou'd not be displeased to see the British
in possession of the N.W. banks of the Ohio as our Neighbors."
The sentiment in Wayne's army was that a war with the British would not only be
advantageous to American interests, but easily won. A letter from an unknown
officer in Wayne's legion written to a friend in Cincinnati on April 22, 1794
states, "You seem to dread a British war; but I have doubts whether we should
not pray for itÉour country is invulnerable, and we have little to lose" against
an "inveterate and persecuting foe."
Wayne's plan, as reported to Knox, was to delay an attack against the
Confederacy so as to pressure the British patience and ability to supply the
Indians, and thereby force them into "some desperate effort" and "compel those
haughty Savages to sue for peace."
Wayne's ultimate goal was a meaningful peace, and if it could be achieved
without costly, protracted battles, so much the better.
The British were vigorously preparing the Indians for war in late 1793. On October 20, Indian Agent Matthew Elliot sent fellow agent Alexander McKee "ten barrels of powder, twenty cases of shot, and two thousand flints, along with other supplies."
In February of 1794, Lord Dorchester gave an inflammatory speech to assembled Indians in which he stated, "I shall not be surprised if we are at war with them [The United States] in the course of the present year...we have acted in the most peaceable manner, and borne the Language and Conduct of the People of the United States with Patience; but I believe our patience is almost exhausted."
The British in Canada did not have authority from the Crown to instigate a war against Wayne's army, but they were successful in influencing the Legislature of Upper Canada to pass a Militia Act in 1794 that granted Simcoe the authority to prepare naval forces, "being obvious that in case of invasion the defence of the Province would greatly depend on the operations on the Lakes & Rivers."
This disposition of the Indian Confederacy in the months before Fallen Timbers is well recorded in a report from Sergeant Lent Munson, late of the first sub-legion in Gen. Wayne's army who had been captured and held prisoner by Indian forces. Munson's report stated that, "the Indians talk with great confidence of their own superiority in numbers and bravery; and boast that they are not
afraid of four to one; they say the American army is made up of cowards and boys. They seem however to stand in awe of Gen. Wayne, though they despise his men." Munson also provided intelligence on the expected plan of Indian
action when he reports "the mode of conducting this campaign will be by attacking escorts of provision and detached parties; and that they will not attack the main army unless they find it weakened or exposed. The Indians have no expectation of being subdued; they say that when they have cut off two or three more armies of Americans, the United States will make peace
with them" The Indians, according to Munson, did not consider Wayne's campaign the final encounter for control of the Old Northwest. They were confident of a favorable outcome, but did not expect an end of frontier warfare to result.
The Battle of Fallen Timbers occurred on the morning of 20 August 1794, a few miles
southwest of present day Toledo. The Indians, who had received intelligence
from deserters and scouts that an attack would occur on the 18th,
began their traditional fast on the evening of the 17th. Wayne
delayed his attack for several days, in order to build Fort Deposit and thus
secure the Legion's baggage, and this pause greatly depressed the Indians. On
the morning of the 20th, hundreds of warriors left the Indian battle
line and traveled to Fort Miami, which was within eyesight from the
battlefield, to get provisions. By chance, Wayne's army attacked the Indians
before most of the warriors had returned to the field. The remaining warriors
put up little resistance and fled the short distance to Fort Miami to regroup
under British command. Or so they thought. The British offered no assistance to
their Indian allies and thus the battle came to an inconclusive end. Wayne's
army lost only 31 soldiers in the brief fight, and between 19 and 40 Indians
Immediately following the action on August 20, 1794, few of the men involved seem to have
conceived that the last battle for the Old Northwest had been fought.
Lieutenant William Clark was surprised that Wayne, having been informed of the
precise position of the Indians from his spies, had not placed the Kentucky
volunteers in the rear of the enemy to "cut off their retreat...thus putting an
end to this expensive war."
Clark was also critical of Wayne for the fact that "not more then 300 out of
1500 well mounted Riflemen were ever brought to action, and they but a few
A report of the battle that reached the Pittsburgh
Gazette stated that a "young man discharged from Wayne's army gave the
following account" of a battle which lasted approximately fifteen minutes,
before the Indians gave way. Substantial
news of the battle was slow to reach Cincinnati but a small
paragraph appeared in the Centinel 23
August that reported: "we are informed by a gentlemen from Greenville" who in
turn had been informed by a small band of Choctaws, "that our army had a
skirmish with the Savages and defeated them.
It was by no means headline news. The resistance from the Indians was so
light that Wayne and his troops "began to apprehend a deception and that the
enemy had sent forward light parties to harass and disorder us, and to draw us
in that Condition into the hands of their main body."
The stage had
certainly been set for a grand battle; Wayne had received intelligence as to
the exact location of the enemy and brief exchanges of fire had occurred with
advance parties of Wayne's legion on several days before 20 August.
A member of the Legion expressed his dismay at Wayne's inability to engage the
enemy on 18 August when he wrote, "A large body of the Enemy had been out in
the morning and had formed a line as with design to receive our Army...and
altho' we have every description of troops...no attempt is made to interprize
[sic] upon them or to take advantage of an Enemy, who do not understand a
single principle of defence, whose great power consists in their invisibility,
who now for the first time within the memory of Man, present themselves a fair
After the battle had begun and the fleeing Indians were not pursued, there was
disgust that "no attempt was made to profit by our victory...this looks more
like unto a drawn battle than a victory." The
troops in the Legion were clearly under the impression that a great battle
would be fought and the Indian forces would suffer great casualties in the
action. They were disappointed and angry that no such event occurred.
Indians had fled from the field swiftly enough to avoid major casualties, but
they had retreated to such a distant over the following days that they could
offer little resistance as Wayne's legion "destroyed & Pilaged the Fields
of Corn & gardins, of the Savages & Burnt large stacks of hay...for
spite Burnt all the Indian Hutts throughout the vicinity of the Garrison."
Small attacks on the body of the army persisted for a few days after August 20th
and Indians were frequently in the area enough so that Clark and the men under
his arms feared "hourly a charge from the Enemy."
Wayne was confident that the enemy had retreated "quite beyond the mouth of the
Miami" but still did not consider the fighting to be complete. In a letter to
Knox written on 28 August, Wayne stated "It is not improbable that the Enemy
may make one more desperate effort against the Army- as it is now said that
Reinforcement was hourly expected at Fort Miamis from Niagara, as well as
Numerous tribes of Indians living on the margins & Islands of the Lakes."
Wayne was actually hopeful that British and Indian reinforcements would arrive
and another battle would commence so that a "more complete & decisive"
victory could be achieved.
appearance of Indians around the Legion's camp led Clark to conclude that the
safety of a departing convey of militiamen was not assured. Clark stated,"Those that are acquainted with the
Situation of the Army will I trust, excuse me for indulging, for a moment
apprehentions that only this escort may fall a Sacrefice to the enrag'd Savages
but that the Situation of the Legion is not the most Secure."
Proof that the legion was still on edge despite Wayne's confidence of safety
can be found in Clark's August 30th entry; "This morning the Camp
alarm'd, the works immediately man'd all
to their posts, in anxious Suspence, awaiting the approach of the Enemey."
No Indians were responsible for the panic but rather the discharge of guns
being cleaned by the volunteers. The weeks after Fallen Timbers were an uneasy
time for the Legion of the United States. Even in late September Wayne was
still surprised at the lack of military action being directed at his army: "We
took up our line of March & arrived at this place on the 17thÉwithout
seeing an Enemy or meeting with any interruption from them. How to account for
their inaction or long silence I am at a loss – unless they are awaiting
the arrival of Governor Simcoe, with the further reinforcement."
closed without word of the battle reaching President Washington, but on 30 August
1794 he authored a letter to John Jay requesting a British response to the
construction of Fort Miami within "the known and until now the acknowledged limits of the United States."
Washington was prepared to use diplomacy to capture the Ohio country should
Wayne's Legion fail to dislodge the British from Fort Miami. Wayne had been
giving instructions by Knox that if "It should become necessary to dislodge the
party at the rapids of the Miami, you are hereby authorized in the name of the
President of the United States to do it."
Washington knew that Simcoe was more likely to heed the demands of the British
government than the demands of General Wayne. Washington was also confident
that London would not attempt "On this irregular and high-handed proceeding of
Mr. Simcoe, which is no longer maskedÉto
hold out ideas of friendly intentions toward the United States, and suffer such
conduct to pass with impunity."
reaction to Fallen Timbers of British authorities in the theatre was not one of
despondency. Simcoe regretted the Indian retreat but still retained hope that,
"when the first impressions shall be worn away...means may be used to restore
them to their wonted resolution."
Simcoe expected the Indians to continue the fight and prepared provisions for
such an occasion. In instructions to Colonel R.G. England, Simcoe encouraged
him "to promise ample payment to all
who shall have their barns and grain burnt, provided they persevere in their
loyalty. G. Britain must pay or
Simcoe also issued orders in the days after Fallen Timbers to commanders at
Forts Niagara, Erie, and Chippewa to send troops westward to Detroit. These
troops were not intended to wage an offensive against Wayne's Legion or to
provide aid for any Indian attack, but were being assembled to defend Detroit
against an American assault. Simcoe also believed that the Indians were still
in a state as to detach to Wayne's rear and disrupt his lines of communication.
Simcoe felt it necessary to strengthen Detroit because not only had the Indians
failed to provide a check to Wayne's advance, but Fort Miami was in no suitable
condition to hold out against an attack. Colonel England reported to Simcoe
that, "I am much concerned to mention to you that the Detachment of Royal
Artillery, & 24th Reg't are much reduced by the FeverÉthey are
very unequal to Garrison Fort Miamis if any thing hostile should be intended."
These acts were not moves of desperation by Simcoe. He had reason to believe that the cause was
not lost on 20 August. McKee reported to Joseph Chew, and this report reached
Simcoe about a week after the 20th, that the Americans had lost
"between 3 and 400 killed and Wounded and a great many horsesÉand retreated the
very same way the came, but whether on account of the want of Provisions, or of
an order from Philadelphia cannot be Certainly known."
McKee had estimated Indian deaths at 19 and thus Simcoe had a casualty report
which very much suggested that the Americans had won a piece of ground in
Wayne's retreat was a surprise to Colonel England who had expected an assault on Fort Miami. In
his report to London in early September, Lord Dorchester informed British
Secretary of War Henry Dundas, that the general belief among the British in Upper
Canada was that Wayne had retreated to await artillery reinforcements with
which to launch an attack in the fall.
It was undoubtedly the sentiment in Upper Canada that the battle of Fallen
Timbers did not amount to a winning of the Old Northwest. Simcoe wrote to
Dorchester that "If there should be a war with the United States, we may expect
it, at the outset, to be violent and universalÉit may take place in the winter,
when all obstacles, but those which a regular siege presents, may in a great
measure be done away."
Wayne had intelligence of the continued British influence on the Indians after the battle
and feared that a fight would resume after the commissions of Wayne's troops
had expired. In December of 1794, Wayne complained to Knox of the "Insidious
part recently taken by the British...to stimulate the savages to continue the
war, who being but too well acquainted with the near approach of that period in
which the Legion will be dissolved; have artfully suggested a suspension of
hostilities until spring in order to lull us into a state of security."
Wayne was committed to arranging peace negotiations with the Indians, but he
was also expecting renewed military action against his forces.
The Indian reaction to Fallen Timbers was one of extreme disappointment. The Indians did
not suffer great casualties but were utterly forsaken by the British at Fort
Miami. The first signs of British weakness were apparent to the Indians after
the failed siege of Fort Recovery. Indians began to disperse from the theater
in large numbers and McKee was faced with the challenging task of encouraging
the Indians to stay and fight while not having authority to pledge British
military support. McKee wrote to England after the failed siege that, "there
would have been little difficulty in stopping all the Indians here, Provided I
had been authorized for that purpose, but we must in that case have taken an
active share in the contest and become at least auxiliaries in the War."
The British had already committed the questionable act of offering nominal
military support to the Confederacy, although these troops were not fully
attired British regulars.
McKee was successful in keeping about 1300 Indians in the field and in the
vicinity of Fort Miami but only a little more than a third of these 1300
Indians would actually participate in the fighting against Wayne.
The Indians' confidence that had been shaken at Fort Recovery was further diminished on
August 14th when the Confederacy met at council to discuss its plans
for opposition against the Americans. At this council, Little Turtle, the
victorious chief at St. Clair's defeat in 1791, expressed his doubts as to the
benefits of opposing Wayne's army. According to many accounts of the
proceedings, Little Turtle stated his opinion that "We have beaten the enemy
twice under separate commanders. We cannot expect the same good fortune always
to attend us. The Americans are led by a chief who never sleeps...it would be
prudent to listen to his offer of peace."
This speech was criticized openly by other chiefs at the council and Little
Turtle was branded a coward; nonetheless, it is likely that Little Turtle's
speech created an impression of futility amongst some of the warriors. Historian
John Sugden states that "It was apparently with misgivings that some Indians
manned the defense line on 19 August."
These misgivings foreshadowed the faint resistance and precipitous retreat that the British
lamented and the Americans celebrated. The retreat was damaging to the Indians
sense of pride but it was not an unprecedented act of defeatism. Historians of
frontier warfare note that it was not the custom of Indian warriors to sustain
significant casualties if a battle seemed too difficult. Historian Colin Calloway
notes that, "Indians readily and regularly gave way in the face of determined
resistance Éto incur heavy casualties in achieving an objective was a concept
foreign and repulsive to Indian peoples."
The Indians were also quick to retreat because the proximity of Fort Miami and
the assumption of British support meant that their retreat was not the end of
the battle but only a preliminary stage. They were deceived.
Major Campbell at Fort Miami did not have the authority to give the Indians quarter and thus did
not open the gates to the fleeing Indians. Calloway credits the eventual
success of Wayne's campaign to Campbell's decision and he writes, "The British
desertion at such a critical moment, rather than the battle itself, proved to
be the vital factor in subduing the Indians."
Calloway goes on to quote Mohawk chieftain John Norton: "The Conduct of the
British Fort dispirited the Confederates much more than the issue of the
battle, which they fought with very inferior number, and in a disadvantageous
position, without considerable loss: this they considered as a misfortune which
might be repaired with glory, - another time; but the former, they did not know
how to remedy."
Campbell's decision to shut the gates of Fort Miami to the retreating Indian forces was
another, but not the last, blow to Indian confidence in the British. As Wayne
proceeded within firing distance of Fort Miami in the days after the battle and
"had not been fired upon" the Indians "complained grievously of their having
been deceived, and were greatly disheartened on finding that they were to
receive no assistance from the British."
More disappointments from their British allies were forthcoming and Jay's
Treaty, which was signed on 19 November 1794, was undisguised, official proof
that the Indian resistance in the Old Northwest would no longer be aided by the
British. When the Confederacy learned that the British agreed to surrender
their frontier posts to the Americans pursuant the treaty, Joseph Brant
complained that it was but, "the second time the poor Indians have been left in
England and the British in Canada by late 1794 were more concerned with protecting their
profitable North American fur trade than securing an Indian buffer state
between them and the Americans.
British interference in the Indian wars was still a chief concern of the
Americans however and Washington's letter to Jay on 30 August 1794 instructed
him to get answers from the British ministry as to their motives for
interference since "there does not remain a doubt, in the mind of any
well-informed person in this countryÉthat all the difficulties we encounter
with IndiansÉresult from the conduct of the agents of Great Britain in this
Washington probably did not have reports of Fallen Timbers and thus could not
relay that encounter's proceedings to Jay as of August 30th. Jay,
after some time, finally responded to Washington saying, "I am authorized by
Lord Grenville to assure you in the most explicit terms that no instructions to
stimulate or promote hostilities by the Indians against the United States have
been sent to the King's officers in Canada."
Jay had planned to present evidence of British interference with the Indians to
Grenville but the treaty negotiations concluded before the British ministry
gave an official answer to the charges of Simcoe's meddling.
Jay's Treaty was followed up nine months later by the Treaty of Greeneville. The
American Indian Policy in the Old Northwest changed, at least in theory if not
in practice, under new Secretary of War Timothy Pickering who took over for Henry
Knox in the spring of 1795. Knox had favored a seizure of Indian lands by force
whereas Pickering believed that the United States should establish the
exclusive right to purchase Indian lands as they should become available.
Pickering's primary goal for the Treaty of Greeneville was "peace and not
increase of territory."
Pickering did consider the lands of southern Ohio to be "an indispensable
condition of peace," but he was willing to pay annuities for them in exchange
for acquiescence. The value
of these annuities was set at a maximum $10,000, but Wayne was still given latitude
to alter that sum since, "The great object is to effect a peace and such a peace as shall let the Indians go way with their minds at ease; otherwise it
may be but the era of renewed hostilities."
The Treaty of Greeneville was a successful Indian treaty for the Americans,
especially when contrasted with earlier treaties signed by the Miami, Shawnee,
or Wyandot tribes. Historian
Rufus King wrote of the Treaty of Greeneville: "Never after that treaty, to
their honor be it remembered, did the Indian nations violate the limits which it
established. It was a grand tribute to General Wayne that no chief or warrior
who gave him the hand at Greene Ville ever after 'lifted the hatchet' against
the United States." However,
the treaty did not prevent but merely delayed an era of renewed hostilities. Historian
Reginald Horsman writes that, "The resounding phrases of the famous Treaty of
Greenville thus meant very little...The Indians thought the Greenville line was
to last forever, the Americans know better."
Land organized for settlement in 1796 and 1800 pursuant the Northwest Ordinance
ignored the boundary line agreed upon at Greeneville. Indian participation in
the War of 1812 was primarily influenced by further American encroachments past
the defined boundaries. Just as Fallen Timbers had failed to be the final
military action of the Old Northwest, the Treaty of Greeneville failed to be
the final peace of the Old Northwest.
The Battle of Fallen Timbers itself cannot be considered a major event in the
history of American expansion because it did not resolve any of the major
issues that had prevented expansion into the Ohio Valley. It did not crush the
spirit of Indian resistance or inflict significant casualties on the
Confederated Indian warriors, though Battle at Fort Recovery did both. It did
not remove the British from the Old Northwest, Jay's Treaty was necessary to
fulfill that purpose. And finally the Battle of Timbers did not secure a meaningful
peace in the Old Northwest, because any peace that did exist owed its origins
to the Treaty of Greeneville. It was only after the Treaty of Greeneville,
writes historian Thomas Boyd, that, "At last the rule of the tomahawk and
musket, which for more than twenty years had made the forests, the rivers and
the plains beyond the Alleghenies a torture chamber and a burial ground... had
reached its end."
 I will use
the terms Indian and Indians in this paper to refer to the Confederacy that was
comprised primarily of the Delaware, Miami, Shawnee, and Wyandot tribes. The
term Natives cannot accurately apply to the Confederacy since many of its
members came from lands far removed from the Ohio valley; other terms such as
'savages' or 'aborigines' will appear only within quotations.
 See Harry Emerson Wildes, Anthony Wayne: Trouble Shooter of the American Revolution (New
York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1941), 397.
 See Leroy V.
Eid, "American Indian Military Leadership: St. Clair's 1791 Defeat," The Journal of Military History 57, no. 1. (Jan., 1993), 71-88.
Ohio Historical Society, "Address of Honorable James
W. Good, Secretary of War, In Hotel Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry, Toledo, Ohio
September 14, 1929." Ohio History 39,
no. 1 (Jan. 1930), 3.
 Randolph C. Downes, Council Fires
on the Upper Ohio (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1940), 334.
 Ibid., 332.
 Ibid., 332-333.
 Downes, Council Fires, 333.
 E.A. Cruikshank, ed, The Correspondence of Lieutenant Governor John Graves Simcoe, with
Allied Documents Relating to His Administration of the Government of Upper
Canada (5 vols. Toronto: Ontario Historical Society, 1923-1931), Vol. 4,
 Richard C .Knopf, ed., Anthony Wayne, A Name in Arms: Soldier, Diplomat, Defender of Expansion
Westward of a Nation (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1959), 13.
 See Knox to Wayne, 20 April 1793 in Knopf, A Name in Arms, 221-225 and Knox to Wayne 16 August 1793, Ibid,. 269.
 Colin G. Calloway, Crown and Calumet: British Indian Relations, 1783-1815 (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 72-73. There is strong evidence that the
American charges against McKee had some merit. See Simcoe Papers Vol. II,
5-17 and Brant to Simcoe 2 Sep. 1793 Ibid.,
Knox to Wayne, 3 Sep. 1793,Knopf, A Name in Arms, 271.
 Thomas Boyd, Mad
Anthony Wayne (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1929), 323, 289.
 The Centinel of
the North-Western Territory (Cincinnati), 16 August 1794.
 Wayne to
Knox, 11 June 1794, Knopf, A Name in Arms,
 The Centinel of the North-Western Territory,
10 May 1794.
 Wayne to
Knox, 5 Oct 1793, Knopf, A Name in Arms, 276-277.
Reginald Horsman, "The British Indian Department and the Resistance to
General Anthony Wayne, 1793-1795," The Mississippi Valley
Historical Review 49, no. 2 (Sep., 1962), 271.
 Quoted in
Downes, Council Fires, 330.
 Simcoe to
Henry Dundas, Simcoe Papers, Vol.
 The Pittsburgh Gazette, 6 September
 See Alan D. Gaff, Bayonets
in the Wilderness: Anthony's Wayne's Legion in the Old Northwest (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 2004), 301-327. Casualty figures are from
"Casualties of Battle of Fallen Timbers," Ohio
History 41, no. 3 (July 1932), 527-530.
 R. C. McGrane, ed., "A Journal of Major-General Anthony
Wayne's Campaign Against the Shawanee Indians in Ohio in 1794-1795 by Lieut.
William Clark," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 1, no. 3 (Dec., 1914), 430.
 The Pittsburgh Gazette, 4 October 1794.
 The Centinel of the North-Western Territory,
23 August 1794.
 Dwight L. Smith, ed., From Greene Ville To Fallen Timbers: A Journal of the Wayne Campaign
July 18-September 14, 1794 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1952)
 See Smith, Greene
 Smith, Greene Ville, 286.
 Ibid., 295.
 McGrane, A Journal, 431.
 Ibid., 433.
 Wayne to
Knox, Knopf, A Name in Arms, 355.
 McGrane, A Journal, 434.
 Wayne to
Knox, Knopf, A Name in Arms, 356-357.
 John Jay, The Correspondence and Public Papers of John
Jay, Vol. IV 1794-1826 (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1893), 55.
 Knox to Wayne,
7 June 1794 Knopf, A Name in Arms,
to Jay, 30 August 1794, in Simcoe Papers Vol. III, 16.
 Simcoe to
R.C. England, Simcoe Papers, Vol.
 Ibid., 5.
 Ibid., 7.
 England to
Simcoe, Simcoe Papers, Vol. III, 22.
Major Campbell himself was forced to quit his command in early September on
account of illness. See England to Simcoe 16 Sep 1794, Vol. III, 95.
 McKee to
Chew, Simcoe Papers, Vol. III, 8.
to Dundas, Ibid., 84.
 Simcoe to
Dorchester, 5 Sep 1794, Ibid., 41.
 Wayne to Knox 23 Dec 1794, Knopf, A Name In Arms, 369.
 Quoted in Downes, Council Fires 334.
State Papers, Indian Affairs. 2 vols.
(Washington D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1832-34), Vol. 1, 491. Approximately 70
militiamen from Detroit fought with the Indian Confederacy
 McKee to Chew, Simcoe
Papers, Vol. III, 7-8. McKee
writes: "There were never more than 400 Indians engaged during the whole day."
The lowest count of engaged Indians found in secondary sources is given by
Sugden in Blue Jacket, 177. Sugden
uses Indian, British, and American sources to arrive at 500 warriors. The
number given by Antoine Lasselle, a British participant, was 1,000 but his
count is not widely accepted as being accurate.
Quoted in John Sugden, Blue Jacket: Warrior of the Shawnees (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 175. See also Calvin Young, Little Turtle: The Great Chief of the Miami Tribe Nation
(Evansville: Unigraphic, 1972), 82.
 Sugden, Blue
 Calloway, Crown and Calumet, 197.
 Ibid., 226.
 Report of
Isaac Weld, Simcoe Papers, Vol. III,
 Quoted in Calloway, Crown and Calumet, 227.
 Samuel Flagg Bemis, "Jay's Treaty and the Northwest
Boundary Gap," The American Historical
Review 27, no. 3(Apr., 1922), 466.
 Jay, Public Papers, Vol. IV, 55.
 Jay to Washington, 29 Oct 1794, Ibid., 122
 See Jay to Washington, 19 Nov 1794, Ibid., 133-134.
 Pickering to Wayne, 8 April 1795 Knopf, A Name in
 Ibid., 401.
 Ibid., 403.
 Ibid., 397-398. Pickering briefed Wayne
on the lack of recognition by the Indians towards the treaties of Fort
McIntosh, Fort Miami, and Fort Harmar and the reasons for the earlier failures.
Anniversary of General Wayne's Treaty of Greenville, Aug. 3, 1895," Ohio History 7, no. 2 (Jan. 1899), 219.
See also, Preston Slossen, "The Significance of the Treaty of Greene Ville," Ohio History 55, no. 1 (Jan., 1936),
 Reginald Horsman, "American Indian Policy in Old Northwest, 1783-1812," The William and Mary Quarterly 18, no. 1 (Jan., 1961), 47.
 Boyd, Mad Anthony Wayne, 322.
State Papers, Indian Affairs. 2 vols. Washington D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1832-34.
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The Pittsburgh Gazette, 19 January 1793
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